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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRM RESETTLEMENT BAR
Refugees are in a uniquely vulnerable position in our global community. As
an effectively stateless person who nevertheless retains rights and protections, a
refugee is both a beneficiary of the global community’s goodwill and a perceived
annoyance to states with domestic problems.1 As one scholar stated, “[r]efugees,
* Third-year law student at the University of California, Irvine School of Law. I would like to thank
my faculty advisor, Professor Stephen Lee, for all his guidance, support, and encouragement on this
Note and my professional and personal development over the last two years. I would also like to
thank my beloved UC Irvine Law Review. It has been an honor and pleasure to work with you all during
these inaugural years at UCI Law.
1. The United Nations Refugee Convention officially defines a “refugee” as an individual
who, “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality,
and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1.A.2, July 28, 1952, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html. The United States has adopted this definition virtually
verbatim, and an asylum seeker will only be granted asylum in the United States if he or she satisfies
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by their existence, constitute an irritant to the sovereign interstate system. . . .
[T]he individual [refugee] remains invisible in the interstate system . . . .”2
The application of the firm resettlement bar exemplifies this balance-striking
between a state’s legal obligations to refugees and its desire to limit the number of
refugees admitted across its borders. The firm resettlement bar precludes a refugee
who seeks protection in a destination country from receiving protection in that
country if the refugee has already received3 some offer of permanent resettlement
in a third country.
The firm resettlement bar derives from international law.4 Under this
principle, Title VIII of the U.S. Code prohibits an asylum seeker who has firmly
resettled from receiving relief in the United States.5 A Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”) regulation defines the term “firmly resettled” as applying to
“[a]n alien [who,] prior to arrival in the United States . . . entered into another
country with, or while in that country received, an offer of permanent resident
status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement unless he or she
establishes [one of two exceptions].”6

that definition of a “refugee.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
This Note uses the term “refugee” more generally to refer to an individual in flight from his
or her country of origin due to either generalized or individualized persecution and who seeks refuge
elsewhere, whether or not such an individual may satisfy the official definition of a “refugee” under
the 1951 Convention or United States law. This is both for descriptive convenience, and also as a
prescriptive suggestion that the officially accepted definition of “refugee” under the 1951 Convention
and United States law may be inadequate to describe the plight of many of these individuals. To be
sure, the definition of “refugee” does not play a central role in this Note.
2. Elspeth Guild, Asymmetrical Sovereignty and the Refugee: Diplomatic Assurances and the Failure of
Due Process, Agiza v. Sweden and Alzery v. Sweden, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL
REFUGEE LAW 120–21 (James C. Simeon ed. 2010).
3. By its plain language and as a matter of historical practice, the firm resettlement bar only
looks to whether a refugee has previously received an offer, not whether she might still receive an
offer in a third country. Query whether this makes sense as a policy matter, since the firm
resettlement bar is meant to exclude refugees who have present or potentially immediate protection
elsewhere. One might say that the policy decision to focus on a previous offer of firm resettlement
impliedly presumes that a refugee’s having received an offer elsewhere means that she can get another
offer again. In practice that is not often the case. At any rate, this is an interesting distinction that
warrants a separate discussion.
4. The term “firmly resettled,” and the principle it represents, was first articulated by the
International Refugee Organization (IRO). Constitution of the International Refugee Organization,
part I.A.3 (Dec. 15, 1946), available at http://unhcr.org/3ae69ef14.html (“the term ‘refugee’ also
applies to persons who . . . have not yet been firmly resettled” (emphasis added)); id. at part I.D.c
(“Refugees or displaced persons will cease to be the concern of the Organization . . . [w]hen they
have, in the determination of the Organization, become otherwise firmly established . . . .” (emphasis
added)). See Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 486, 2011 WL 1826845, at **3 (BIA 2011).
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (2006) (for asylum seekers who have arrived on United States
soil) and 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(1) (2006) (for overseas refugees applying to enter the United States).
Similar to this Note’s broad usage of the term “refugee,” see supra note 1, this Note will use the term
“asylum seeker” to refer generally to both asylum seekers who have already arrived in the United
States, as well as overseas refugees applying to resettle here.
6. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15 (2010).
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The United States’ adoption of the firm resettlement bar reflects its desire to
balance its duties under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
as extended through the 1967 Protocol,7 with its concerns about shouldering an
excessive share of the burden for the international refugee protection regime. As
the Supreme Court stated in 1971 in its first and only decision interpreting the
firm resettlement bar:
Congress [intended through its refugee legislation for] this country [to]
fulfill its obligations to refugees, but also [to provide] an incentive to
other nations to do likewise. [That legislation] was enacted to help
alleviate the suffering of homeless persons and the political instability
associated with their plight. It was never intended to open the United
States to refugees who had found shelter in another nation and had
begun to build new lives. Nor could Congress have intended to make
refugees in flight from persecution compete with all of the world’s
resettled refugees for the [United States’ refugee quota]. Such an
interpretation would subvert the lofty goals embodied in the whole
pattern of our refugee legislation.8
This Note does not take issue with the notion that the firm resettlement bar
reflects the proper balance between an obligation to protect refugees and a desire
to share that obligation with other countries, at least in principle. Rather, it takes
issue with the lack of “accurate and precise judgments” in firm resettlement
analysis.9 This lack of robustness results in a jurisprudence that no longer
considers the context and narrative behind the refugee’s flight to the United States
and thus loses sight of whether U.S. refugee law is effectuating the goals of the
international refugee protection regime. Instead, it transforms the firm
resettlement bar into an administrative loophole that makes it easier for the U.S.
government to thwart even meritorious asylum cases.10
This lack of robustness stems from ongoing difficulty in answering the
fundamental question underlying the firm resettlement doctrine: has the asylum
seeker received an offer of permanent resettlement in a third country that is
sufficient to discharge the United States’ duties under the Refugee Convention
and Protocol? In other words, firm resettlement jurisprudence is essentially a quest

7. As the Supreme Court has explained, “Although the United States has never been party to
the 1951 Convention, it is a party to the Protocol, which incorporates the Convention’s definition in
relevant part.” I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 438 (1987) (citing United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6225, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (1968)). See also United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (1951). Congress ratified the 1967
Protocol through H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 96-781, at 19 (1980).
8. Rosenberg v. Woo, 402 U.S. 49, 55–56 (1971).
9. Matthew J. Fery, Determining Better Standards for Firm Resettlement, Judicial Discretion, and
Immigration Administrative Practice: Diallo v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2004), 31 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 505, 516 (2006).
10. See generally Robert D. Sloane, An Offer of Firm Resettlement, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV.
47 (2004).
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to determine whether the offer of residence that a refugee received in a third
country is meaningful enough that the United States need not admit the asylum
seeker in order to satisfy its obligations to the refugee protection regime.
The question of what constitutes a meaningful offer of permanent
resettlement has vexed Immigration Judges (IJs) and federal courts for years.11
There are two practical reasons for this confusion. First, offers of residence to
refugees vary widely. Second, refugees rarely, if ever, arrive in the United States
with documentation regarding their residency or status in another country.
First, as the Seventh Circuit articulated, “The ‘some other type of permanent
resettlement’ language likely was added to account for the great variety in names
and types of permanent offers of settlement in countries around the globe . . . .”12
Along the spectrum of offer types, the edge cases are relatively straightforward. At
one end of the spectrum are offers of permanent residency that are closely akin to
U.S. legal permanent resident (LPR) status or citizenship. Examples of countries
that make such offers include Brazil13 and Canada,14 which both make refugees
eligible to apply for permanent residency.15 Such offers of permanent residency
expressly constitute offers of permanent resettlement within the meaning of the
firm resettlement bar.16
11. See, e.g., Fery, supra note 9, at 512 (“The exact parameters of what constitutes an offer of
permanent settlement have been the subject of considerable discussion and debate among the
courts.”).
12. Diallo v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 687, 695 (7th Cir. 2004). See also Fery, supra note 9, at 511–12
(“Since no binding precedent or elaborative authority exists on what constitutes firm resettlement,
individual states, through their own jurisprudence and regulatory powers, have created their own
standards toward determining whether a party was firmly resettled prior to seeking asylum.”).
13. Permanent Residency in Brazil, ANGLOINFO, http://brazil.angloinfo.com/countries/brazil/
residency.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).
14. Refugee Claims in Canada—After Applying, CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA,
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/inside/apply-after.asp (Sept. 9, 2011). Canada has one of the
world’s best immigration systems in terms of congruence between policy and enforcement and in
terms of positive public opinion concerning immigration. See generally Jeffrey G. Reitz, Canada:
Immigration and Nation-Building in the Transition to a Knowledge Economy, in CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION:
A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 97 (Wayne A. Cornelius et al. eds., 2d ed. 2004); see id. at 98 (“for Canada,
the gap between policy goals and policy outcomes has been relatively small”).
15. I hasten to emphasize that “the fact that [a country] offers a process for applying for some
type of refugee or asylum status is not the same as offering the status itself.” Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450
F.3d 961, 977 (9th Cir. 2006) (the firm resettlement bar did not apply to petitioners, even though they
had a “safe, four-year residence in Canada, where they were able to work and receive benefits, and
[had a] pending application for refugee status,” because they never received an offer of permanent
residency from the Canadian government). However, the point remains that in Brazil and Canada,
refugees can and do receive offers of permanent residency, and that these offers seem to be similar if
not identical to LPR status in the United States.
16. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15 (expressly including offers of “permanent resident status” or
“citizenship”); see, e.g., Kai-Rui Pan v. Mukasey, 314 F. App’x 328, 330 (2d Cir. 2008) (petitioners were
firmly resettled in Brazil, because there was evidence that they had received a “valid permanent
residence visa” from the Brazilian government); Asheber v. Ashcroft, 97 F. App’x 733 (9th Cir. 2004)
(petitioner was firmly resettled in Canada, where he had received permanent residence status); Lumio
v. I.N.S., 11 F. App’x 799 (9th Cir. 2001) (same).

Assembled_V2I1_v5 (Do Not Delete)

2012]

FINDING A MEANINGFULNESS PRINCIPLE

4/17/2012 1:22 PM

483

At the other end of the spectrum are offers of residency that might be
characterized as begrudging permission to stick around. For example, due to Iraq’s
sectarian violence, Iraqi refugees have thronged into Jordan and other neighboring
countries. According to one estimate, about 800,000 Iraqi migrants were living in
Jordan as of April 2007.17 However, these Iraqis have no legal status; the
Jordanian government only recognizes Iraqis as “guests,” which grants them
neither “a clear legal status nor the right to work” and is expressly temporary.18
Though I has not found any cases interpreting Jordan’s “guest” status, such an
explicitly temporary status would not appear to satisfy the definition of an offer of
permanent resettlement, especially of the type tantamount to an offer of
permanent resident status or citizenship.19
Firm resettlement jurisprudence deals mostly with cases that fall between
these two extremes. Take a typical hypothetical example.20 Jameela, a 25-year-old
woman, flees the sectarian and war violence in Iraq to live with her extended
family in the United States. En route, Jameela is stuck in Cairo, Egypt, because she
does not have enough money to obtain a visa and plane ticket and stays for four
years. There, she registers with the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which provides her with a permanent
refugee card. The Egyptian government accepts Jameela’s permanent refugee card
and coordinates with the regional UNHCR office to allow her to stay in Egypt
until the UNHCR can help her find a country of resettlement.21 Although this
arrangement does not grant Jameela the right to work, she secures odd jobs in
order to make a living and shares the rent for a two-bedroom apartment with
three Palestinian refugee families. Like most refugees in Egypt, she does not
17. Ibrahim Saif & David M. DeBartolo, The Iraq War’s Impact on Growth and Inflation in Jordan,
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF JORDAN, July 2007, at 5, available at
http://www.jcss.org/uploadeconomic/118.pdf.
18. 2011 UNHCR Country Operations Profile—Jordan, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/
49e486566.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2011); see also Nicholas Seeley, The Politics of Aid to Iraqi Refugees in
Jordan, 40 MIDDLE EAST REPORT, Fall 2010, available at http://www.merip.org/mer/mer256/politicsaid-iraqi-refugees-jordan (Out of fear that “the crisis narrative would lead to Iraqis becoming like the
millions of Palestinian refugees to whom Jordan already plays host,” the Jordanian government has
“argued that many displaced Iraqis were not refugees—instead, they were ‘guests’ whose stay would
be temporary.”).
19. One thing we can say about an offer of “permanent resettlement” is that, under the
doctrine of ejusdem generis, we should interpret that general descriptor as limited by the two narrower
descriptors preceding it. Thus, an offer of “permanent resettlement” is something tantamount to an
offer of permanent resident status or an offer of citizenship. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15.
20. I have constructed this hypothetical based on various cases I have reviewed through my
work with the Iraqi Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP), which was founded at Yale Law School in
2008 and is currently based at the Urban Justice Center in New York City. IRAQI REFUGEE
ASSISTANCE PROJECT, http://www.iraqirefugee.us (last visited Oct. 7, 2011). A classmate and I cofounded the UCI Law chapter of IRAP at the end of 2009.
21. See UN Refugees, listed in Types of Refugee Permits, PASSPORTS, EMIGRATION &
NATIONALITY ADMINISTRATION, http://www.moiegypt.gov.eg/English/Departments+Sites/
Immegration/ForignersServices/EkametAlAganeb/AlLageen/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2011).
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qualify for any other types of residency visas that would allow her to stay
indefinitely,22 though it is unlikely that the government would force her out. Has
she received an offer of permanent resettlement?
It is hard to say. In accepting Jameela’s UNHCR refugee card and formally
recognizing her refugee status, one could argue that the Egyptian government has
implicitly made her an offer to stay indefinitely and that this offer sufficiently
resembles permanent residency. However, strictly speaking, the possibility of
staying indefinitely does not constitute an offer of permanent residency. Indeed,
not only did the Egyptian government fail to offer Jameela the option of applying
for permanent residency,23 but it had no such program available. On the other
hand, Jameela was able to work and had a place to live, although neither was
particularly stable, and her employment was, in fact, illegal. In this case, it is
unclear whether the refugee has received an offer of permanent resettlement in
the third country. As will be shown below, Immigration Courts and circuit courts
have had to weigh multiple factors, including various forms of indirect (non-offerbased) evidence, to decide whether or not an offer to remain in a third country
constitutes an offer of permanent resettlement.
The second reason for confusion in defining an offer of permanent
resettlement is that refugees typically do not arrive in the United States with any
substantial documentation that might prove the existence vel non (or not) of an
offer. As Professor Robert D. Sloane wrote:
Asylum seekers seldom arrive with documentation of a formal offer of
permanent resettlement in a third state. Those states that tend to receive
large refugee flows seldom treat refugees, either in law or practice, in an
orderly manner that would enable adjudicators to conclude with
confidence that an offer of some kind of permanent resettlement had or
had not been extended. More often than not, the [former] INS therefore
resorts to a variety of non-offer-based factors as evidence in an effort to
establish a prima facie case of firm resettlement.24
Courts rarely decide firm resettlement claims based on direct evidence of an offer
of permanent resettlement. Rather, where courts have held that a refugee was
firmly resettled in a third country, they have often looked to non-offer-based

22. See Types of Residence Permits, PASSPORTS, EMIGRATION & NATIONALITY
ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.moiegypt.gov.eg/English/Departments%20Sites/Immegration/
ForignersServices/Visa/) (last visited Oct. 7, 2011).
23. An offer of permanent resettlement need not come in any particular form, and a
third country may generally define what an alien must do in order to accept its offer. As
relevant here, a third country’s offer of permanent resettlement may consist of providing a
defined class of aliens a process through which they are entitled to claim permanent refuge.
If an alien who is entitled to permanent refuge in another country turns his or her back on
that country’s offer by failing to take advantage of its procedures for obtaining relief, he or
she is not generally eligible for asylum in the United States.
Elzour v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1143, 1152 (10th Cir. 2004).
24. Sloane, supra note 10, at 61–62.
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evidence of firm resettlement.25 This has led to an undesirable obfuscation of firm
resettlement analysis,26 which this Note seeks to remedy.
In attempting to resolve these problems, the circuit courts have split between
two tests for determining what constitutes an offer of firm resettlement. The
Ninth, Seventh, and Third Circuits have adopted the “direct offer” or “offerbased” approach,27 which “focuses on the existence of an offer vel non, made by a
government, of some type of permanent residence that would allow the alien to
remain in that country indefinitely in some official status. . . . Under this approach,
the courts look first to direct evidence of an offer . . . . If direct evidence is
unobtainable, the courts look to indirect evidence of an offer . . . .”28 The Second
and Fourth Circuits have instead adopted a “totality of the circumstances”
approach,29 which “considers evidence of a direct offer of firm resettlement as
only one factor to be considered with other factors that are not offer based, which
we refer to as ‘indirect evidence.’”30 Other circuits have remained undecided.31
The Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) recent decision in Matter of AG-G- is a welcome step towards providing decision makers with guidance on how
to conduct firm resettlement analysis. The A-G-G- decision constitutes the BIA’s
first time establishing a framework for determining firm resettlement.32 In A-G-G-,
the Board incorporates both the direct offer and totality of the circumstances
approaches and clearly lays out a burden-shifting process for adjudicating a firm
resettlement claim. However, the A-G-G- framework contains a defect that
unfairly lessens the government’s burden of proving firm resettlement at the
25. See, e.g., Sultani v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 878, 882 (8th Cir. 2006) (admitting that “in some
cases direct evidence of such an offer may be difficult or impossible to procure” and that
“[c]onsequently, other factors may be considered to determine whether an alien’s stay in a third
country was more than simply ‘a stopover en route to refuge in the United States’”); Firmansjah v.
Gonzales, 424 F.3d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that petitioner was firmly resettled in Singapore,
based on her “admission in both her written application and oral testimony that she had received
permanent resident status in Singapore,” although there was no direct evidence of that permanent
resident status anywhere in the record); Nahrvani v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2005)
(holding that petitioner was firmly resettled in Germany, based on such non-offer-based evidence as
his marriage to a German woman and his ability to travel freely throughout the country, but no
evidence whatsoever of some offer of residence by the German government).
26. Sloane, supra note 10, at 58.
27. See, e.g., Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2006); Diallo v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d
687 (7th Cir. 2004); Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477 (3d Cir. 2001).
28. Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 486, 2011 WL 1826845, at **9 (BIA 2011).
29. See, e.g., Sall v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2006); Mussie v. INS, 172 F.3d 329 (4th
Cir. 1999).
30. Matter of A-G-G-, 2011 WL 1826845, at **9.
31. Id. (discussing pertinent First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuit cases).
32. At least, this is the BIA’s first decision establishing such a framework since 1990, when the
firm resettlement bar shifted from being a merely discretionary bar to a mandatory bar to asylum.
Matter of A-G-G-, 2011 WL 1826845, at **11 (“[T]he Board has not issued a decision setting forth the
proper framework to apply to firm resettlement determinations under current law since Matter of
Soleimani [20 I. & N. Dec. 99 (BIA 1989)], when firm resettlement was applied as a discretionary
factor.”).
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expense of the asylum seeker. In Part II, I explain that the defect stems from the
Board’s incorporation of a practical error made by certain circuit courts that have
adopted the totality of the circumstances test. This error leads to the absurd result
that, in practice, the government is virtually never required to consider direct
evidence of an offer of permanent resettlement, but is permitted to utilize
extraneous, non-offer-based factors to construct its prima facie claim of firm
resettlement. The asylum seeker, however, is not afforded a similar opportunity to
construct a counter-case.
In order to fill this gap, I argue that the A-G-G- framework should
incorporate some meaningfulness principle that will rebalance the equities
between the government and the asylum seeker. In Part III, I recommend
constructing this meaningfulness principle by using the same non-offer-based
factors that originated with the totality of the circumstances test, but applying
these factors more contextually. In particular, I recommend that decision makers
apply the meaningfulness principle by looking not only to the conditions of the
asylum seeker’s life in the country of alleged firm resettlement, but also to the
conditions of the life that she would have in the United States.
In doing so, I also respond to three potential counterarguments. The first
counterargument is that requiring a decision maker to compare a refugee’s ties to a
third country with her ties to the United States contravenes the language of the
firm resettlement bar, which expressly considers only the refugee’s conditions in
the third country. I argue that a comparative analysis would better effectuate the
purpose of the firm resettlement bar by allowing decision makers to obtain a
clearer picture of how and why the asylum seeker came to request asylum from
the United States, and therefore how and why the protection she received in the
third country might have been insufficient.
Second, I will seek to allay concerns that incorporating a meaningfulness
principle into firm resettlement law will incentivize unscrupulous country
shopping by asylum seekers. I contend that some degree of country shopping is
desirable because it leads to more durable solutions for refugees; the real concern
is country shopping that abuses the asylum system. Third, I argue that establishing
a more robust framework will not inherently increase the number of refugees the
United States has to admit. A more robust framework would admit more of the
types of refugees that our asylum law was meant to admit while foreclosing more
of the claims that the firm resettlement bar was meant to exclude.
In Part IV, I conclude by summarizing my recommendations and advocating
a more balanced, robust firm resettlement analysis. The purpose of the refugee
protection regime is neither to provide refugees with the very best relief nor to
shift them around like objects. Rather, the regime exists to provide refugees with
some sense of dignity and well-being in order to allow refugees to start new lives,
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not just away from the persecution they faced in their countries of origin, but also
toward an existence that retains, within reason, “all that makes life worth living.”33
II. THE BOARD’S NEW FIRM RESETTLEMENT FRAMEWORK IN MATTER OF A-G-GA. The Board’s Decision in Matter of A-G-GIn the 2011 Matter of A-G-G- case, a Mauritanian man fled his native country
due to persecution at the hands of its soldiers. After being involuntarily deported
from Mauritania, he landed in Senegal, where he lived for over eight years. There,
he married a local woman, had two children, found a job, and was issued an
identification card by the Senegalese government. Thereafter, he traveled to the
United States and sought asylum from the U.S. government.
The IJ adjudicating his asylum claim granted him asylum and held that he
had not firmly resettled in Senegal. Instead of adjudicating the issue of whether
this finding was valid, the BIA established a general framework for analyzing a
firm resettlement claim and remanded the case to allow the IJ to apply it. That
framework is the focus of this Note.
This is the first time that the BIA has established such a framework since at
least 1990, when the firm resettlement bar shifted from discretionary to
mandatory.34 The BIA’s A-G-G- framework is a welcome synthesis of the direct
offer approach and the totality of the circumstances approach. The framework has
four steps:
1. Initially, the government’s DHS attorney bears the burden of presenting
prima facie evidence of firm resettlement.
A. First, the government should attempt to discharge this burden by
presenting direct evidence of an offer. “In order to make a prima facie
showing that an offer of firm resettlement exists, the DHS should first
secure and produce direct evidence of governmental documents
indicating an alien’s ability to stay in a country indefinitely. Such
documents may include evidence of refugee status, a passport, a travel
document, or other evidence indicative of permanent residence.”
B. Failing that, the government can use indirect evidence of an offer (i.e., nonoffer-based factors). “If direct evidence of an offer of firm resettlement is
unavailable, indirect evidence may be used to show that an offer of
firm resettlement has been made if it has a sufficient level of clarity and
force to establish that an alien is able to permanently reside in the
country. Indirect evidence may include the following: the immigration
laws or refugee process of the country of proposed resettlement; the
length of the alien’s stay in a third country; the alien’s intent to settle in
33.
34.

Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
See infra note 38.
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the country; family ties and business or property connections; the
extent of social and economic ties developed by the alien in the
country; the receipt of government benefits or assistance, such as
assistance for rent, food, and transportation; and whether the alien had
legal rights normally given to people who have some official status,
such as the right to work and enter and exit the country.”
 The distinction between purely direct and circumstantial evidence is
critical for understanding my argument. Although the BIA labels the
first set of items above as “direct evidence” and the second set as
“indirect evidence,” these are misnomers.
 Strictly defined, so-called direct evidence does not include
“evidence of refugee status, a passport, a travel document, or other
evidence indicative of permanent residence.” Instead, direct
evidence could include a green card or its equivalent, an
identification card listing the permanent residency status, or an
official, written grant of permanent residency.
 Evidence that merely “indicat[es]” the existence of such an offer
should instead be called circumstantial evidence. This classification
would distinguish such evidence from so-called “indirect
evidence,” which, in spite of its label, is not indirect evidence of an
offer, but rather evidence unrelated to an offer; this evidence is
invoked not to provide circumstantial evidence of an offer, but
rather to indicate a circumstance meaningfully equivalent to an
offer.
 Despite these issues, this Note uses the terms “direct evidence”
and “indirect evidence” in the way that the BIA defines them—
that is, “direct evidence” will consist of purely direct and
circumstantial evidence, and “indirect evidence” will consist of
non-offer-based evidence.
 If the government cannot succeed in proving an offer through direct or
indirect evidence, then the inquiry is over, and the IJ must find against
firm resettlement.
2. If the government succeeds at Step 1, the asylum seeker can rebut the
government’s evidence by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
such an offer has not been made or that she would not qualify for that
offer.
3. The IJ should then consider the totality of the evidence to determine whether
the asylum seeker has rebutted the government’s evidence.
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4. If the IJ finds that the asylum seeker has firmly resettled in the third country,
the burden shifts to the asylum seeker to establish either of the two
enumerated exceptions to firm resettlement.35
Step 1 reflects the BIA’s synthesis of the direct offer approach and the
totality of the circumstances approach. The BIA emphasized that
[d]espite these divergent approaches, there is consistency in the
framework applied by the circuit courts. The courts agree that the DHS
bears the initial burden of going forward with evidence indicating that the
firm resettlement bar applies. . . . Both approaches provide for the
consideration of direct and indirect evidence of an offer of permanent
resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent
resettlement . . . .36
The BIA’s framework synthesizes the circuit courts’ approaches by
recognizing that both approaches contain the same two steps: first, consideration
of direct evidence of an offer (reflected in Step 1A above), and second, where
direct evidence is unavailable, consideration of indirect evidence of an offer
(reflected in Step 1B above). However, as this Note will show next, the fact that
“indirect evidence” expressly refers to non-offer-based factors creates a problem
by effectively making Step 1A meaningless and by unfairly lowering the
government’s burden to establish a prima facie case for firm resettlement at the
asylum seeker’s expense.
B. The Meaningfulness Gap in the A-G-G- Framework
As presently designed, the BIA’s framework codifies an existing practical
error by decision makers who adopted the totality of the circumstances approach.
As Professor Sloane discussed in detail, the totality of the circumstances test
originates from a pre-1990 regime during which the firm resettlement bar was only
a discretionary bar.37 Under that regime, courts looked to firm resettlement as only
one factor among many other, non-offer-based factors to determine whether or
not to grant asylum to a refugee.38 As such, the firm resettlement doctrine was not
so much a bar as one policy consideration in an open-ended asylum analysis.
35. Matter of A-G-G-, 2011 WL 1826845, at **12–14.
36. Id.; see also Sarah Lynne Campbell, Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, and Your Country Shoppers:
Reevaluating the Firm Resettlement Requirement in U.S. Asylum Law After Maharaj v. Gonzales, 21 BYU J.
PUB. L. 377, 382–84 (2007).
37. Sloane, supra note 10, at 58–59.
38. Id. Between 1957 and 1990, there was no explicit firm resettlement bar in either INS
regulatory law or statutory law that applied to the adjudication of asylum claims. Nevertheless, the
INS continued to consider firm resettlement as one factor in determining whether or not to grant
asylum to an individual. In its 1971 decision Rosenberg v. Woo, 402 U.S. 49 (1971), the Supreme Court
accepted and thus incorporated into federal common law the INS’s practices. In Woo, the Supreme
Court held “that the ‘resettlement’ concept is not irrelevant. It is one of the factors which the [former]
Immigration and Naturalization Service must take into account to determine whether a refugee seeks
asylum in this country as a consequence of his flight to avoid persecution.” 402 U.S. at 56 (emphasis
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In a discretionary regime, the fact that courts looked to non-offer-based
factors was not problematic, even where there was no direct evidence of an offer.
“If [an offer of] firm resettlement is but one factor among many to be weighed in
the exercise of discretion, then even in the absence of a genuine offer of
permanent resettlement, circumstances such as long residence in and family ties to
a third state may militate against”—as well as in favor of—“a favorable exercise of
discretion.”39
In a discretionary analysis, the existence vel non of an offer of permanent
resettlement was not essential to a decision maker’s analysis; what mattered was
the policy behind the firm resettlement doctrine. That is, the decision maker could
have refused asylum if the facts suggested that doing so would effectuate the
policy behind what we now call the firm resettlement doctrine—a balance
between satisfying the United States’ duty to protect refugees and its need to share
that obligation with other countries.
However, under the post-1990 regime in which firm resettlement is a
mandatory bar, the totality of the circumstances approach has become inapposite
and leads to absurd results.40 DHS’s and Congress’s shift from a discretionary bar
to a mandatory bar is in essence a statement that the policy underlying the firm
resettlement bar can only be realized through an inquiry into the existence vel non
of an offer of permanent resettlement.41 Therefore, where direct evidence of an
offer is available, the firm resettlement inquiry is over, and the decision maker
must find that the refugee has resettled in the third country.
Direct evidence of an offer has remained dispositive since the firm
resettlement bar first became a mandatory bar, and neither the BIA’s A-G-Gframework nor this Note’s recommended revisions change that. However, this
shift to a mandatory bar regime means that where direct evidence of an offer is
unavailable, courts should only consider non-offer-based factors insofar as those
factors serve as a proxy for direct evidence of an offer. Anything less means that non-offerbased factors no longer act in service of “the paramount firm-resettlement
inquiry”42—the existence vel non of an offer—but rather only serve to lessen the
government’s burden of proving firm resettlement through a patchwork of
inherently extraneous factors.
Under a mandatory bar regime, where there is no direct evidence of an offer
of permanent resettlement, the consideration of only non-offer-based factors
added). Thus, Woo effectively established a discretionary firm resettlement bar up until 1990, when the
INS amended its regulations to make the firm resettlement bar mandatory. Congress adopted the
mandatory bar in 1996 through its amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act in that year.
See also Matter of A-G-G-, 2011 WL 1826845, at **4–8 (outlining this same history); Campbell, supra
note 36, at 379–81 (same).
39. Sloane, supra note 10, at 59.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 58.
42. Id. at 60.
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constitutes a lesser alternative for proving the existence vel non of an offer, rather
than a proxy for a vel non offer. This lesser alternative makes it easier for the
government to invoke the firm resettlement bar at the asylum seeker’s expense.43
As discussed above, because there is rarely direct evidence of an offer, this lesser
alternative is in practice not the exception, but the rule.44 Indeed, courts following
the totality of the circumstances test have ignored the logically precedent question
of a vel non offer. Many courts have considered only non-offer-based factors in
holding that asylum seekers were firmly resettled.45
The BIA’s framework has implemented this error wholesale. Under the A-GG- framework, courts are no longer required to resolve the logically precedent
question of a vel non offer before moving on to non-offer-based factors. In Step
1 of the A-G-G- framework, the government is allowed either to use direct
evidence of an offer of permanent resettlement (Step 1A); or, where there is no
such evidence, to simply decline to present even circumstantial evidence of a vel
non offer and instead opt for a lesser alternative: namely, patching together its
firm resettlement case using extraneous, non-offer-based factors (Step 1B).46 This
essentially nullifies Step 1A since the government can always satisfy its initial
burden by resorting to Step 1B (non-offer-based factors) as a lesser alternative to
direct evidence of an offer of permanent resettlement. Therefore, the BIA’s
purported synthesis of the direct offer approach and the totality of the
circumstances approach is fundamentally unsound. The BIA has not really
synthesized the two approaches at all, but rather has effectively—though perhaps
inadvertently—chosen the totality of the circumstances approach over the direct
offer approach.
This error can be fixed in at least three ways, the third of which this Note
recommends. The first solution is to remove Step 1B of the BIA’s framework and

43. Id. (“[I]t tends in practice to transform what should be a question distinct from the
refugee-status inquiry into an additional criterion of refugee status.”); see also id. at 47–48 (This
approach turns the firm resettlement bar into “a regulatory loophole by which the [government]
attempts to remove refugees with otherwise valid persecution claims.”).
44. Id. at 61.
45. Id. at 58–60.
46. What makes all the difference is that there is an implied “or” between Steps 1A and 1B.
This is not obvious at first glance, because the BIA’s language states that DHS should “first” secure
direct evidence of an offer, and only then “may” go on to consider non-offer-based factors. This
seems to answer Professor Sloane’s problem, but a closer reading shows it does not. Step 1B of the
framework actually permits indirect evidence—that is, non-offer-based factors—to constitute an
independent and sufficient basis for a prima facie case of firm resettlement. The BIA’s framework
would have properly remedied Professor Sloane’s problem if it had instead incorporated an “and”
between Steps 1A and 1B: if and only if there is direct evidence of an offer may the government
consider non-offer-based factors. However, that is not how the BIA chose to synthesize the direct
offer and totality of the circumstances approaches. Therefore, we must now confront a framework in
which either direct or indirect evidence of an offer constitutes a sufficient basis for a prima facie case
of firm resettlement, even though the language of the framework appears to give primacy to direct
evidence.
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require decision makers to consider only direct evidence of an offer of permanent
resettlement. However, this solution simply takes decision makers back to square
one: what does an offer of “permanent resettlement” mean? Notwithstanding that
firm resettlement is now mandatory and offer-based, “if clear evidence of an offer
does not exist, a court’s analysis should not end there.”47 A pure direct offer
approach would not only be problematic in theory, but mostly useless in practice
because direct evidence of an offer of permanent resettlement is rarely available.48
The fact that even those circuits which expressly adopted the direct offer
approach have looked to non-offer-based factors in deciding firm resettlement
reflects this approach’s practical limitations.49
The second solution is to simply return to a discretionary bar regime.
Though tempting at first, this solution is not ideal. The purpose of firm
resettlement law is to realize a balance of equities between the U.S. government
and asylum seekers, and it appears that either a discretionary or mandatory bar
regime can create that balance—provided that decision makers use the proper
framework. Returning to a discretionary bar regime would therefore be missing
the point. Incidentally, the firm resettlement bar was once a mandatory bar
anyway, from the time when Congress enacted the Displaced Persons Act of
194850 until the time when Congress amended51 the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952.52
This Note advocates a third solution: retaining Step 1B and making it more
robust. The BIA’s synthesis of approaches to defining firm resettlement is
welcome because it comes closer to increasing this robustness. Courts that
previously adopted the direct offer approach already looked to indirect evidence
of an offer where direct evidence of an offer was absent.53 The BIA’s framework
not only incorporates that approach but also clarifies that such indirect evidence
consists of the non-offer-based factors used by other courts. Conversely, for those
courts that previously adopted the totality of the circumstances approach, the

47. Fery, supra note 9, at 513.
48. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Fery, supra note 9, at 513 (“In the late-1990s, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that when direct evidence of an offer does not exist, other non-offer factors may be used to
establish a presumption of firm resettlement.” (citing Cheo v. INS, 162 F.3d 1227, 1229 (9th Cir.
1998)).
50. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, ch. 647, § 2(c)(1), 62 Stat. 1009, 1009
(“‘Eligible displaced person’ means a displaced person [who] on January 1, 1948, had not been firmly
resettled . . . .”).
51. Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639.
52. Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 486, 2011 WL 1826845, at **2–4 (BIA 2011)
(outlining this history).
53. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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BIA’s framework refocuses the inquiry back on the central question in the
mandatory bar regime: the existence vel non of an offer.54
In an otherwise helpful framework, the error discussed above can be
corrected by recognizing the error as a gap and then filling that gap. If Step 1B
constitutes a lesser alternative to Step 1A, then courts should read some principle
into Step 1B to render it equivalent to Step 1A. In other words, courts may cure the
A-G-G- framework by implementing a meaningfulness principle to make indirect
evidence an adequate proxy for direct evidence where direct evidence is not
available. This Note posits that that principle should be the principle articulated
below. This meaningfulness principle utilizes and expands on the non-offer-based
factors in Step 1B to help determine what an offer of firm resettlement means.
III. CONSTRUCTING A MEANINGFULNESS PRINCIPLE
A. Composing a Meaningfulness Principle with Non-Offer-Based Factors
In order to construct a meaningfulness principle, we need look no further
than the same non-offer-based factors that have paradoxically caused the defect in
the A-G-G- framework. The non-offer-based factors are not problematic per se,
but rather because, under the current framework, they work asymmetrically in
favor of the government by lowering the government’s burden of establishing a
prima facie case for firm resettlement. Decision makers can repair this asymmetry
by contextualizing the non-offer-based factors so as to look not only at how the
factors apply to the asylum seeker’s life in the third country, but how the factors
apply comparatively to the life the asylum seeker would have in the United States.
The non-offer-based factors inherited from the totality of the circumstances
test, and which the BIA explicitly mentioned in A-G-G-, are:
 The immigration laws or refugee process of the country of
proposed resettlement;
 The length of the alien’s stay in a third country;
 The alien’s intent to settle in the country;
 Family ties and business or property connections;
 The extent of social and economic ties developed by the alien in the
country;
 The receipt of government benefits or assistance, such as assistance
for rent, food, and transportation; and
 Whether the alien had legal rights normally given to people who
have some official status, such as the right to work and enter and
exit the country.55
54. This third solution has the added bonus of not requiring the BIA to overrule its decision
in Matter of A-G-G-, but simply interpreting its language therein so as to avoid an absurd result.
55. Matter of A-G-G-, 2011 WL 1826845, at **12.
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At first glance alone, these factors suggest the sort of meaningfulness
principle that would give substance to the definition of firm resettlement. Firm
resettlement law is rife with value-laden words that relate to the meaningfulness of
a refugee’s life in a country: “safe homeland,”56 “effectively accepted,”57
“established roots,”58 “a haven for homeless refugees,”59 “a haven from
persecution,”60 “significant ties,”61 etc. The non-offer-based factors listed in Step
1B speak directly to such value-laden concepts, and thus to the heart of firm
resettlement law. For instance, if a refugee intended to stay in a country, then she
also intended to develop “significant ties”; if she stayed for a long time, it is safe to
say that she has been “effectively accepted”; if she has family ties and business or
property connections, it is safe to conclude that she has “established roots” and
found a “haven” from her previous life of suffering; and so forth.
But beyond that, the non-offer-based factors also comport directly with
refugee rights under international law. Professor James Hathaway has compiled a
virtually comprehensive list of these rights, which he derived in particular from the
1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Refugee Protocol, as well as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).62
The most pertinent of those refugee rights for the purposes of firm resettlement
law include the following:63
 The right to physical security;64
 The right to family unity;65
 Freedom of residence and internal movement;66
56. Makadji v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 450, 454–58 (2d Cir. 2006).
57. Id.
58. Rosenberg v. Woo, 402 U.S. 49, 51 (1971).
59. Id.
60. Sultani v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 878, 882 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Ali v. Reno, 237 F.3d 591,
595 (6th Cir. 2001)).
61. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15(a); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15(b).
62. See generally JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005). On June 8, 1992, the United States ratified the ICCPR, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368, although it did so with a series of Reservations, Understandings, and
Declarations (RUDs) that are not directly related to refugees’ rights. U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and
Understandings, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 CONG. REC. S4781 (daily ed. Apr. 2,
1992), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/civilres.html; 1 United Nations, Office of
Legal Affairs, Treaty Section, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, at 206, U.N.
Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/26 (Apr. 1, 2009), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/publications/
MTDSG/2009/English-I.pdf. On October 5, 1977, the United States signed the ICESCR, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360, but it has never ratified the ICESCR. United
Nations, supra, at 184.
63. Though other refugee rights in Hathaway’s book are no doubt relevant to a decision
maker’s adjudication of a refugee’s asylum claim, the rights I have chosen here are those which I
believe speak directly to whether or not a refugee obtained “meaningful” residence.
64. HATHAWAY, supra note 62, at 439–60.
65. Id. at 533–60.
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 The right to work, including the right to wage-earning
employment;67
 The right to public relief and assistance;68
 The right to housing;69 and
 So-called “rights of solution,” meaning rights to a durable solution
to refugee crises, which include rights to repatriation, voluntary
reestablishment, resettlement, and naturalization.70
As the table below shows, with two important exceptions, the non-offerbased factors listed in Step 1B correspond to the various rights that refugees
possess under international law. Although this list of non-offer-based factors is
not meant to be exhaustive,71 the point remains that these factors are clearly
consistent with international law.

66. Id. at 695–719.
67. Id. at 730–86. Professor Hathaway explains that this is not “a right actually to secure work,
only freely to seek work.” Id. at 739 n.50.
68. Id. at 800–13.
69. Id. at 813–29.
70. Id. at 913–90.
71. See Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 486, 2011 WL 1826845, at **12 (BIA 2011)
(“Indirect evidence may include the following . . .” (emphasis added)).
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Corresponding Right(s) Under
International Law

The alien’s intent to settle in the
country

 Freedom of residence
 Rights of solution
 Varied combinations of other
rights (family unity, wage-earning
employment, etc.) that depend on
the refugee’s situation and inform
her desire to go to a country72

Family ties and business or property
connections

 Family unity
 Right to work

The extent of social and economic ties
developed by the alien in the country73

 Freedom of internal movement
 Right to work
 Right to housing

The receipt of government benefits or
assistance, such as assistance for rent,
food, and transportation

 Right to physical security
 Freedom of residence and internal
movement
 Right to public relief and assistance
 Right to housing

Whether the alien had legal rights
normally given to people who have
some official status, such as the right to
work and enter and exit the country

 Right to work
 Rights of solution
 Varied combinations of other
refugee rights

The first two non-offer-based factors—the immigration laws or refugee
process of the third country and the length of the alien’s stay in a third country—
are not included in this list because they are unrelated to the nature of a refugee’s
life in a third country. They might instead be characterized as circumstantial
evidence of an offer, and should therefore be seen as “direct evidence” as the BIA

72. I will discuss this more below, infra text accompanying notes 79–88, when I respond to
concerns about encouraging refugees to country shop.
73. One could argue that this non-offer-based factor corresponds with the ICESCR as a
whole.
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applies that label.74 This is distinct from what are properly called the non-offerbased factors, which instead concern whether the asylum seeker’s life in the third
country was meaningful enough that denying asylum might still effectuate the aims
of the international refugee protection regime.75 As such, these first two factors
will likely bleed into Step 1A of the BIA’s framework, which looks to direct
evidence of an offer of permanent resettlement.
In sum, the various non-offer-based factors enumerated in Step 1B of the
BIA’s firm resettlement framework give substance to a meaningfulness principle.
The first two of these factors will likely overlap with Step 1A because they are
more properly characterized as circumstantial evidence than non-offer-based
evidence. The remaining factors go directly to what it means to have meaningful
protection, and therefore to what it means to have an offer of permanent
resettlement where there is no direct evidence of an offer of status tantamount to
permanent residency or citizenship. This Note suggests that non-offer-based
factors, including but not limited to those enumerated in Step 1B, should combine
to create the meaningfulness principle.76
However, merely constructing a meaningfulness principle does not solve the
gap within the A-G-G- framework. To do that, decision makers must apply this
principle properly.
B. Applying the Meaningfulness Principle to the A-G-G- Framework
Without more, referring to the non-offer-based factors as a meaningfulness
principle does not resolve the defect in Step 1B, which lessens the government’s
burden of establishing a prima facie case of firm resettlement at the asylum
seeker’s expense. This asymmetry stems from the fact that the BIA’s framework
allows the government to utilize non-offer-based factors in arguing against asylum,
but does not allow the asylum seeker an equal chance to utilize the same factors in
arguing for asylum.
While it is true that in Step 2 the asylum seeker has the option of responding
to the government’s prima facie case, Step 2 only allows the asylum seeker to
rebut the government’s case by showing “that such an offer has not in fact been
made, or that he or she would not qualify for that offer.”77 Therefore, in rebutting
the government’s prima facie case for firm resettlement, the BIA’s framework
74. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 34–35.
75. Id.
76. I also refer the reader to a case note from 2006, Fery, supra note 9, in which Fery argues
for something akin to a meaningfulness principle in firm resettlement analysis. Fery argues like I do
that a consideration of “the big picture” is necessary for preventing a firm resettlement standard that
is “much too vague and broad,” id. at 517. Further, Fery argues, like I do, that consideration of nonoffer-based factors “is relevant for courts in ascertaining whether the petitioner is firmly resettled, but
also is helpful for determining more accurate and precise judgments,” id. at 516, that is, more robust
judgments.
77. Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 486, 2011 WL 1826845, at *14 (BIA 2011).
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allows the asylum seeker to refer only to direct evidence of a vel non offer, not to
non-offer-based factors.
In order to resolve this gap, this Note recommends placing the
meaningfulness principle not only in the hands of the government, but also in the
hands of the only person who can know what is meaningful for her: the asylum
seeker. In Step 2, the asylum seeker should be allowed to invoke the non-offerbased factors placed at the government’s disposal in Step 1B by arguing how they
militate in favor of her starting a new life in the United States. Further, in Step 3,
the IJ should regard the totality of the evidence as looking not only to the asylum
seeker’s life in the third country, but also to how it compares with the life she would
have in the United States.
The question of whether the asylum seeker’s life in the third country rises to
the level of permanent resettlement should not be answered in a vacuum.
Decision makers should view the totality of the evidence as part of a broader
narrative that ends with why the asylum seeker desires to live in the United States.
Therefore, the decision maker should consider evidence of not only the asylum
seeker’s previous life in the country of alleged firm resettlement, but also the
asylum seeker’s potential life in the United States. In this way, the meaningfulness
principle might be characterized as a meaningful use of evidence.
Though the decision maker may consider the evidence of the asylum seeker’s
potential life in countries other than the United States or the country of alleged
firm resettlement, the meaningfulness principle’s main concern should be the
evidence of the asylum seeker’s potential life in the United States. The United
States is only one player in a cooperative international refugee protection regime.
Although it should do its best to effectuate the goals of that regime, it can only do
so within the orbit of its responsibility. The U.S. government has no control over
whether or not other countries will take in refugees.
Indeed, if U.S. decision makers decided that an asylum seeker was firmly
resettled in a third country, the United States would send that asylum seeker back
to the third country without being able to guarantee that the asylum seeker would
receive protection in the third country; the decision about protection would
remain vested exclusively with the third country’s government. As such, an
American decision maker’s ambit consists only of what the United States can do
for a refugee, as compared to what the country of alleged firm resettlement can
do—or rather, has done—for her.
It would be improper to establish bright-line rules for how much weight
each non-offer-based factor should receive under the revised firm resettlement
analysis. However, one example illustrates certain guiding principles. Perhaps the
most important non-offer-based factor is the capacity of the asylum seeker to
work in the third country as compared to the United States. A job is foundational
to the refugee’s ability to start a new life, and thereby to truly escape her
vulnerable state. Of course, a refugee-receiving country has no duty to, say,
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provide a refugee with a $150,000 salary. However, it would also be ludicrous to
suggest that a refugee could ever survive on less than a living wage.
Thus, evidence of an asylum seeker’s access to a living wage in a third
country, either through government programs for refugees or family connections,
would militate in favor of finding firm resettlement, whereas the same access in
the United States would militate against finding firm resettlement. The threshold
for “sufficient” protection is not about supplying the most meaningful solution to
an asylum seeker, but rather about supplying a solution that is meaningful at all.
Therefore, although the more robust firm resettlement framework is not meant to
provide the refugee with a windfall, it should force the decision maker to consider
whether the United States or the country of alleged firm resettlement would better
provide the sort of minimally durable and feasible solution that would allow a
refugee to be safe and secure.
There are three significant counterarguments to this framework. The first is
that the plain language of the firm resettlement bar, both in U.S. law and
international law, looks only to whether there was permanent resettlement in the
third country; it says nothing about conditions in the United States.78 However,
the moment that decision makers consider non-offer-based factors at all, they
have already moved away from the plain language of the bar and into the realm of
equity and therefore context. To then argue that that context should be skewed
almost entirely in the government’s favor makes a farce of the firm resettlement
bar and the balance-striking policy that it is meant to represent.
The apparent dichotomy between a refugee’s actual life in a third country
and her prospective life in the United States is false. The meaningfulness of such
factors as length of stay, family ties, etc., is profoundly contextual. Take two men
who have traveled from China to escape political persecution, one named Ming
and the other named Wei. After their flight from China, Ming and Wei ended up
in Australia. They have now arrived on U.S. soil and requested asylum. Neither the
men nor DHS have been able to secure evidence of any formal offer of protection
by the Australian government. Therefore, the IJs presiding over the men’s cases
must resort to adjudicating firm resettlement using the following non-offer-based
evidence.
Neither man had social or economic ties to Australia, but each resided in
Australia for three years before saving enough money to travel to the United
States. In short, Ming and Wei had the same form and length of residence in
Australia. Should Ming and Wei be returned to Australia, it is unclear what formal
protection they would receive from the Australian government, if any. That said,
the evidence shows that their ties to the United States differ greatly. Ming has
78. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15; 1951 Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1.E (“This Convention shall
not apply to a person who is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he has
taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the
nationality of that country.”).
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most of his immediate and extended family in the United States, including three
siblings who can give him a job at a corner store when he arrives. In contrast, Wei
has hardly any family in the United States. Most of his family is located in China
or, through refugee resettlement, in Germany.
Because the evidence suggests that the men had the same form of residence
in Australia, then without a consideration of the men’s ties to the United States, if
Wei is found to have firmly resettled then so must Ming. However, this creates a
strange result. Granting asylum to Ming as opposed to Wei would do a
dramatically better job of fulfilling the United States’ obligations to the refugee
protection regime, and therefore the purpose of the firm resettlement bar. It is
almost assured that admitting Ming into the United States would enable him to
obtain a durable solution to his flight from persecution: he would be able to work
and thus earn a living wage, connect to a family network and thus make new
connections leading to better personal and professional opportunities, and above
all feel safe and secure once and for all.
In contrast, Wei’s plight—though sympathetic—does not suggest that he
would have any more durable of a solution by receiving asylum in the United
States than in Australia. In fact, it appears that he would have a more durable
solution were he to live with his extended family in Germany.79 More than Ming,
he appears to be the sort of refugee that Congress intended to redirect to a third
country through the firm resettlement bar.
Under an overly formalistic firm resettlement analysis that only examines the
men’s lives in Australia, their cases appear identical. However, to say that Ming
firmly resettled in Australia and thereby to foreclose his asylum claim in the
United States would more likely flout one of the central purposes of the firm
resettlement bar, which is to help the United States fulfill its obligations to the
refugee protection regime. Conversely, to say that Wei is firmly resettled in
Australia would more likely fulfill the purposes of the firm resettlement bar.
This interpretation of the men’s situations is not meant to supplant a
necessarily fact-intensive adjudication; indeed, it is not even clear that an IJ should
conclude that either Ming or Wei was firmly resettled in Australia. Rather, this
hypothetical is merely meant to illustrate that were an IJ to conduct a firm
resettlement analysis on the men’s claims, it would be overly formalistic and
disingenuous for the IJ to look only to evidence of their lives in Australia while
ignoring directly pertinent evidence of their prospective lives in the United States.
To interpret the firm resettlement bar in such a formalistic manner divorces the

79. Germany is another leader in refugee resettlement. See, e.g., Asylum Levels and Trends in
Industrialized Countries, First Half 2011: Statistical Overview of Asylum Applications Lodged in Europe and
Selected Non-European Countries, UNHCR, at 3 (Oct. 18, 2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
4e9beaa19.html (explaining that Germany was third, following the United States and France, in
refugee applications in the first half of 2011).
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bar from its twin goals, as well as the goals of the refugee protection regime that it
is meant to serve.
A second, related counterargument is that incorporating a meaningfulness
principle into firm resettlement law will incentivize refugees to take advantage of
the refugee system by country shopping. If there has been any recurring policy
concern about admitting refugees into the United States, it has been this one. As
one scholar stated, “If courts allow asylum based on . . . broad and vague [firm
resettlement] standards, . . . a significant risk exists that many fraudulent claims
could move through the system merely because no vel non offer of resettlement
was made to the petitioner.”80 Moreover, what scant legislative history there exists
on the firm resettlement bar speaks directly to this concern.81
However, the refugee protection regime should allow for some degree of
country shopping.82 Country shopping unnerves decision makers and policy
makers because it seems to indicate that some asylum seekers are not in fact
genuine refugees, but individuals simply seeking to game the system. The concern,
therefore, is not with country shopping per se, but with country shopping as an
indication of refugees’ abuse of U.S. asylum law. For genuine refugees and asylum
seekers with sincere claims, there are good reasons for allowing a bit of country
shopping. Establishing better relationships between host governments and
refugees fosters more durable and sustainable forms of protection, and therefore
best effectuates the refugee protection regime.
In order to determine that fit, decision makers must apply a meaningfulness
principle: they must ask where the refugee might be able to secure the minimal
resources—in terms of economic stability, family ties, and so forth—that will give
her a fighting chance to start a new life.83 The refugee protection regime does not
80. Fery, supra note 9, at 526.
81. See Asylum and Inspections Reform: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on International Law,
Immigration, and Refugees, 103d Cong. 345 (1993) (statement of Michael T. Lempres, Former Executive
Associate Commissioner for Operations, Immigration and Naturalization Service) (“I think that the
very concept of asylum is offering protection to someone who is fleeing persecution. It is not
intended to provide an individual with the ability to select in which of several safe countries he or she
wants to live. I think that if you have come through, for example, London, under current law, if you
have not firmly resettled, you are not returned to London. I would question that, because I think it
makes good sense to return a person to a country where he is safe from persecution. If you have
successfully avoided the persecution that has caused you to leave your home country, then the burden
on the United States ought to be greatly diminished.”); id. at 300 (statement of Dan Stein, Executive
Director, Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR)) (“Over the course of the 1980s in a
couple of key settlements, the Department of Justice negotiated away its ability and its authority to
take the circumstances of entry into consideration in adjudicating asylum claims. An aliens [sic], acting
inconsistently with asylum status—that behavior should be a proper part of the adjudication record.
[This includes such behavior as] forum shopping or nation shopping [and] passing through several
safe countries . . . .”).
82. Special thanks to my classmate, Joni Carrasco, also a third-year law student at UCI Law,
for this important insight.
83. See, e.g., GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 394 (3d ed. 2007) (“A country may be ‘safe’ for asylum-seekers of a certain origin and ‘unsafe’
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exist to give to every refugee the best possible form of protection. Not only is this
not feasible, but it is wrong as a matter of existing law.84 But just because a
specific grant of refugee protection cannot be ideal does not mean that it should
be meaningless. Although the refugee protection regime should not incentivize or
condone abuses of asylum law, the need to prevent abuses does not militate in
favor of a less robust firm resettlement framework, but rather a more robust one.
Moreover, the concern over country shopping loses its force when one
realizes that there is no clarity or uniformity in the refugee protection regime such
that refugees can realistically choose between adequate forms of protection. The
reality is that signatories to the Refugee Convention are not executing their duties
in a uniform way that ensures that refugees have meaningful lives wherever they
go.85 “[D]espite the front of unity at the level of refugee jurisprudence, the
international refugee regime . . . is still highly fragmented . . . .”86 Therefore, it is a
mistake to suggest that a refugee is asking too much by requesting that she be
resettled in the United States when doing so might offer her a better chance at
creating a new life.
Such a suggestion is predicated on the illusion that the international refugee
protection regime runs like a well-oiled machine. It does not. “Most of the world’s
refugee movements are not subject to arranged distribution among receiving
states. Spontaneity and anarchy, rather than organized distribution of asylumseekers and refugees, constitute the norm.”87 In light of the variance between
offers of residency in different states and the lack of assurance that different
refugees with different backgrounds and needs can receive sufficient protection in
any particular country, firm resettlement analysis must retain a meaningfulness
principle.
A final counterargument is that increasing the government’s burden of
proving firm resettlement would force the United States to take in more than its
for others of a different origin, also depending on the individual’s background and profile. Removal
will constitute unlawful deportation . . . unless it can be ascertained that each individual will be
readmitted to the third country, will enjoy effective protection against refoulement, will have the
possibility to seek and enjoy asylum, and will be treated in accordance with accepted international
standards.” (quotations omitted)).
84. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15 (“An alien is considered to be firmly resettled if, prior to arrival
in the United States, he or she entered into another country with, or while in that country received, an
offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement . . .”).
85. See, e.g., HATHAWAY, supra note 62, at 6 (“Instead of a universal and comprehensive
system of human rights law, the present reality is a patchwork of standards of varying reach,
implemented through mechanisms that range from the purely facilitative to the modestly coercive.”);
Guild, supra note 2, at 121 (“The result is substantial differences in recognition rates of refugees with
the same nationality and circumstances in different host states.”).
86. Nergis Canefe, The Fragmented Nature of the International Refugee Regime and Its Consequences: A
Comparative Analysis of the Applications of the 1951 Convention, in CRITICAL ISSUES, supra note 2, at 186; see
generally HATHAWAY, supra note 62, at 6.
87. Asha Hans & Astri Suhrke, Responsibility Sharing, in RECONCEIVING INTERNATIONAL
REFUGEE LAW 84 (James C. Hathaway ed., 1997).
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fair share of refugees. This is a particularly acute concern because the United
States is already a leader in admitting refugees when compared to other signatories
to the Refugee Convention and Protocol.88 However, because a rebalanced firm
resettlement analysis is simply meant to increase robustness, adopting this Note’s
recommendations would in theory lead neither to more nor to fewer asylum
seekers being admitted into the United States.
This Note does not argue that the meaningfulness principle should serve as a
one-way ratchet in favor of refugees and against the government. It only argues
that because the revised framework is more robust than previous firm
resettlement frameworks, it would foreclose less meritorious asylum claims while
admitting more meritorious asylum claims. In other words, the revised framework
would admit more of those sorts of refugees who would best effectuate the goals
of the refugee protection regime, without necessarily increasing or decreasing their
number. For example, under the traditional totality of the circumstances approach,
a decision maker might well decide that Wei from the above example has not
firmly resettled because his ties to Australia are tenuous. However, under this
Note’s revised firm resettlement framework, a decision maker might decide that
Wei has firmly resettled because his ties to the United States are comparably
similar to his ties to Australia.
Admittedly, this Note’s revised framework may nevertheless lead to decision
makers granting more asylum claims. However, such an outcome would only
reflect that in previous firm resettlement cases, decision makers often found
refugees to be firmly resettled even where such findings worked at cross-purposes with the
refugee protection regime. Such an outcome would mean that firm resettlement analysis
had not been working. If so, it would be nonsensical to argue that we should
abandon a more robust framework because it sheds light on the unworkability of
previous frameworks. This Note does not necessarily advocate for more grants of
asylum claims, but it certainly supports such a result if that result follows from a
more robust firm resettlement analysis.
The fear that the U.S. government will take in more than its share of
refugees is predicated on an assumption that but for restrictions on the refugee
admissions process, there would be a flood of refugees into the United States.
This is not a realistic concern for two reasons. First, the refugee protection regime
itself has a throttling mechanism to prevent such a flood. Asylum seekers most
often seek refuge in the United States through resettlement administered by the

88. See, e.g., Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries, supra note 79, at 9 (“The United
States of America continued to be the largest single recipient of new asylum claims during the first six
months of 2011, accounting for one out of five claims lodged in the 44 countries included [in the
report].”); Eleanor Ott, Get Up and Go: Refugee Resettlement and Secondary Migration in the USA, UNHCR
Research Paper No. 219 (Sept. 2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/
opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=4e5f9a079 (“Since 1975, the United States has resettled nearly three
million refugees, more than all other countries combined.”).
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UNHCR, which takes the refugee’s ties to the United States into consideration.89
Therefore, where the UNHCR refers a refugee to the United States for
resettlement, the refugee protection regime has already envisioned that that
refugee is well suited for life here. That does not mean that the U.S. government is
then required to admit that refugee, but it does mean that there has already been
some threshold consideration of whether a refugee should be resettled in the
United States before her case even becomes subject to U.S. refugee law.90 Second,
the United States is not necessarily refugees’ preferred country of resettlement or
asylum.91 Asylum seekers are in dire straits. They are unable to return to their
home countries or make lives for themselves in whichever countries they fled to.
Insofar as the UNHCR or other agencies will acknowledge a refugee’s preference
for a resettlement country, such agencies may heed that preference. In general,
however, refugees will take any relief they can get. They will not, therefore, rush to
apply to the United States because they heard of a revision in U.S. firm
resettlement law—a fantastic notion, to say the least. In practice, firm resettlement
law will touch that limited number of cases where a refugee professes, either
sincerely or fraudulently, that she wishes to live in the United States. It is then the
job of the decision maker to consider that wish in light of the available evidence
and the twin goals of the firm resettlement bar.
As a final reminder, the firm resettlement bar is an exceptional bar to
otherwise meritorious asylum claims. It is not as if lowering the government’s
burden of proving firm resettlement also disables the government from arguing
against the merits. Nevertheless, as previously discussed, courts have made it
easier for the government to satisfy its burden without giving the asylum seeker
any similar help. The revised framework proposed in this Note is meant to
rebalance that asymmetry. It is meant to reverse the trend toward turning the firm
resettlement bar into “an additional criterion for refugee status” and away from
the exceptional bar that it was intended to be.92
To summarize, where direct evidence of an offer of permanent resettlement
is available, the BIA’s firm resettlement framework does not change: the inquiry
should end, and decision makers should rule that the refugee has firmly resettled.
89. UNHCR, UNHCR Resettlement Handbook (July 4, 2011), at 353–54, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/4a2ccf4c6.html. It is noteworthy that some of the key factors that go into
determining the country of submission, such as family unity and availability of health treatment, are
identical or similar to the non-offer-based factors discussed in this Note.
90. See Resettlement, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a16b1676.html (last visited Nov.
14, 2011).
91. See, e.g., Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries, supra note 79, at 3. Though the
United States received more new asylum applications (36,400) than any other country in early 2011, it
did not receive more by much. The following countries have comparable numbers, meaning that
many asylum seekers did not seek out the United States as their first choice: “France was second with
26,100 asylum applications, followed by Germany (20,100), Sweden (12,600), and the United
Kingdom (12,200).” Id.
92. Sloane, supra note 10, at 48.
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But where only indirect evidence of an offer is available, decision makers should
read a meaningfulness principle into the BIA’s framework. That meaningfulness
principle should consist of the non-offer-based factors inherited from the totality
of the circumstances test. These non-offer-based factors include, but are not
limited to, those factors enumerated in Step 1B. Further, decision makers should
apply this meaningfulness principle to the BIA’s framework by allowing the
asylum seeker to invoke non-offer-based factors to argue in Step 2 that she was
not firmly resettled in a third country. Decision makers should then regard the
totality of the evidence contextually by comparing the life the asylum seeker had in
the country of alleged firm resettlement to the life she would have in the United
States.
IV. CONCLUSION
The BIA’s recent decision in Matter of A-G-G- provides a helpful framework
that synthesizes previously conflicting approaches to firm resettlement law and
promotes a more robust firm resettlement analysis. This Note argues that
although the A-G-G- framework is helpful, it contains a significant defect that,
without more, would unfairly lower the government’s burden of proving firm
resettlement at the expense of the asylum seeker’s ability to rebut that claim.
In order to cure that defect, courts must read a meaningfulness principle into
the A-G-G- framework. That meaningfulness principle should be composed of the
various non-offer-based factors utilized in the so-called totality of the
circumstances test. These factors—the extent of family ties, social ties, economic
ties, and so forth—not only give substance to a meaningfulness principle, but also
comport with refugees’ rights under international law.
Professor Pheng Cheah recently wrote “that hospitality is the implicit
essence and truth of the law . . . .”93 This Note has attempted to reintegrate that
spirit of hospitality into a field of law that should always have embraced it: firm
resettlement law. In practice, firm resettlement analysis has largely been anything
but robust, merely providing the government with another avenue to prevent a
refugee from receiving asylum in the United States while weakening the refugee’s
ability to make her counter-case.
By reinforcing the BIA’s new firm resettlement framework with a
meaningfulness principle, the United States can ensure that those who have the
best chance of making new, better lives in this country are allowed to do so, while
safely returning others to third countries where they already have sufficient
protection. There is a fundamental fairness in this that even a refugee who was
denied asylum is likely to appreciate. For if an asylum seeker knows that there is
some meaningfulness rationale behind her denial, she is more likely to accept that
93.

Pheng Cheah, Necessary Strangers: Law’s Hospitality in the Age of Transnational Migrancy, in LAW
(Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2010).
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the equities were against her, instead of feeling that she had fallen victim to some
arbitrary, technical legal standard.
In a system where refugees are effectively stateless because their countries of
origin are unwilling or unable to protect them, allowing refugees to receive
protection in another country gives them back their ability to eat, to work, to feel
safe, and to communicate with their fellow human beings—that is, it gives them
back their human dignity. Unfortunately, the refugee protection regime remains
fragmented and unstable. As such, where a refugee-receiving country is able to
inject some human dignity into its asylum laws and procedures, it should do so. A
meaningfulness principle in U.S. firm resettlement law is essential to guaranteeing
that the firm resettlement bar reflects an appropriate balance of equities between
the U.S. government and the asylum seeker, rather than serving as a hammer
which the U.S. government can use to shatter the asylum seeker’s otherwise
meritorious claim.

